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ON BEING A POSITIVIST:
DOES IT REALLY MATTER?*
FREDERICK VAUGHAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
2
In a recent volume of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal,
Professor Peter Hogg, writing on the CanadianCharterof Rights and

Freedoms2 and American theories of interpretation, stated:
I should make clear an underlying assumption of the article that will render some
of the discussion unsatisfying to some readers. I do not believe in "natural rights.'
If that makes me a positivist, so be it. I do not know how to identify natural rights,
from whence they derive their authority, or what the legal effect of their breach
could be. I do not trust any judge to reach conclusions on these matters. My
scepticism is reinforced by the widely differing accounts of rights that are given by

legal philosophers such as Dworkin, Rawls, Nozick,
and Finnis, who do believe in
3
natural rights. To me rights are creatures of law.

This statement, to which I would like to offer the following
response, is typical of the kinds of new and important issues lawyers
and law professors have been forced to consider directly since the
Charter came into force in 1982. I would like to demonstrate that
the issues are profoundly important and cannot be dismissed as

Professor Hogg has done. But, before proceeding to address the
substantive issues raised in Hogg's disclaimer, I would like to reflect

upon the statement itself.
Copyright, 1991, Frederick Vaughan.
Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph.
1 P.W. Hogg, "The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation" (1987)
25 Osgoode Hall L-. 87.
2 Part I of the Constitution Ac; 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
3 Hogg, supra, note 1 at 89.
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The first thing that emerges from Hogg's statement is the
lack of clarity as to what constitutes a natural right. In a footnote
to the central statement, Hogg says: "All I mean by 'natural rights'
are rights derived from sources other than positive law."4 But that
definition is inadequate. The source of natural rights is hinted at in
the very term itself: nature. The voluminous literature on rights
(going well beyond Rawls, Dworkin, and Nozick 5 ) clearly identifies
two fundamental sources of law: nature and convention (law).
Rights are derived from nature (whatever that may mean for the
moment) or by convention, that is, by human (individual or
collective, i.e. legislative) fiat. As Gary Glenn has written:
All rights, supposing there are such, either exist apriorior else on the basis of some
argument. That basis may be a "subjective" reality (convention) or else an
"objective" reality (nature). If rights are based on nothing more than convention,
whether this means custom, ordinary law, or a more permanent constitution, the
only issue regarding assertion of a particular right is whether one has thepower to
get agreement to recognize it. Here reason is restricted to ends determined by
desire and is unable to argue an intrinsic claim to a right since there are no such
claims. If, however, rights are founded on an objective reality, reason can still
determine that the denial of a particular claim to a right is contrary to objective
right. 6

Hogg clearly does not subscribe to Blackstone's natural law
based teaching. By implication, he sides with Blackstone's great
critic Jeremy Bentham whose Fragment on Government7 is a scathing
assault on Blackstone. It becomes necessary, therefore, for us to
explore the Blackstone-Bentham controversy before proceeding
further because, by implication, we are being invited by Hogg to side
with him and Bentham against Blackstone (and John Locke,
Blackstone's mentor). In the Commentaries, Blackstone wrote that:

4Ibid. n. 8.
5 J.Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978);
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); R. Nozick,
Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).
6 G.D. Glenn, "Abortion and Inalienable Rights in Classical Liberalism" (1975) 20 Am.
J.Jur. 62 [emphasis added].
7 J. Bentham, A Fraginct on Govenment (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1988)[hereinafter Fraginent];and J.lentham, An Ittroduction to the Principlesof Morals and
Legislation (New York: Hafner, 1948).
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The rights of persons considered in their natural capacities are ... of two sorts,

absolute and relative.

Absolute which are such as appertain and belong to

particular men, merely as individuals or single persons: relative which are incident

to them as members of society, and standing in various relations to each other.8

And a little later, he goes on to say that
the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those
absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature ...
Hence, it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and
regulate those absolute rights of individuals ... And therefore the principal view of
human laws is, or ought always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such rights
as are absolute which in themselves are few and single.9

As to the rights of the people of England, Blackstone claims
that "these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles;
the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the
right of private property."10 And in an attempt to specify further
the right of personal security, Blackstone states that "personal
security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment
of
11
his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation."
Thus, Blackstone does not have Hogg's difficulty of
identifying natural rights. Nor does he have Hogg's problem of
enforcing them. For Blackstone, the civil or state (positive) laws
must be conducive to the ends specified by nature: "uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation." These uninterrupted enjoyments cover the full range
of what we would now call civil rights. Granted, they are not
spelled out as, for example, the right to vote, the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty, etc. However, they are easy
and necessary extensions of Blackstone's statement as, indeed, the
common law tradition had done until Bentham's axe was levelled at
the roots.
Blackstone would find it an easy matter to support the
people of Eastern Europe and South Africa in their struggle for
8 Sir W. Blackstone, Coimnentaries on the Laws of England, vols 1-4, 5th ed. (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1765) at 123.
9 Ibid. at 124-25.
10 Ibid. at 129.
11 Ibid.
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freedom against the oppressive positive regimes under which they
have lived for almost half a century. For Blackstone, people - by
nature - enjoy "absolute rights ... such as would belong to their

persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled
to enjoy, whether out of society or in it."1 -'
Hogg, by contrast, would appear to say that the aspirations
of the people of Eastern Europe or South Africa are not grounded
in nature, but in the will of the legislatures of those countries, that
is, in convention. That means that Blackstone's principles are more
immediately conducive to democracy than are Hogg's, for the people
of Eastern Europe and South Africa are appealing over the heads
of their governments (and legislatures) to a higher or more
fundamental right: the natural right of all men and women to be
free. Thomas Paine articulated this doctrine most forcefully in the
late eighteenth century in his Rights of Man.13 It is no coincidence
that Paine was a founding member of the first anti-slavery society in
the United States or that he, as secretary to the Pennsylvania
Assembly, wrote the preamble for the first anti-slavery resolution.
Nor is it surprising to learn that Bentham was employed by the
proponents of slavery.14 It is difficult to see how Hogg's principles
would be very helpful to oppressed peoples. If, indeed, there is no
claim to rights beyond the legislative power, then there is no right
to revolution. By Hogg's principles, oppressed people would have
to be patient, and try to persuade the sovereign legislative body to
confer greater rights and liberties, but there would clearly be no
claim as of right for such peoples.
Somehow Hogg's positivism fails those who are oppressed
when they need help the most. But this is the essential weakness
of positivism: it favours oppression over freedom, except in those
regimes that have the good fortune to be liberal. Yet, regimes that
have the good fortune to be liberal have no grounds for that good
fortune other than the good fortune itself. Those nations and
peoples who live in Western liberal regimes can afford the luxury
12 Ibid. at 123 [emphasis added].
13 T. Paine, Rights of Man (New York: Willey, 1942).
14 See P. Palmer, "Benthamism in England and America" (1941) 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.

1991]

On Being a Positivist

403

of positivism; those who live under oppressive governments cannot.
Indeed, those of us who share the good luck of living under liberal
regimes are at the mercy of those who rob us of our good fortune
and impose an oppressive regime. We would not be able to appeal
to nature in our efforts to throw off tyranny, all we would be able
to appeal to is our former condition of freedom. But that former
condition could never, in Hogg's view, be claimed as a fight.
As well, Hogg's positivism reduces our outrage over apartheid
in South Africa to silence. The oppressive laws of South Africa are
sound laws: formal legislative enactments of the legislature of South
Africa. Those of us who believe that they are unjust laws base that
claim in human nature. This gives us the authority to transcend the
legal space of our own liberal democratic regime and denounce the
apartheid laws of South Africa as unjust. They are unjust because
they offend the natural right to liberty that Blackstone asserted
earlier and that Paine propagated in the Rights of Man. The
Blackstone-Paine thesis advocates universal nature: that all men
ought, by nature, to be free. Granted, the assertion of universal
natural rights does not prove their existence. But the universal or
near universal outrage that greets the oppressive policing tactics of
apartheid points simply to the existence in men and women of a
ground that is universal and natural.
Jeremy Bentham, Hogg's implicit mentor, claims that natural
rights teaching is a "dangerous doctrine" because it provides the
foundation for oppressed peoples. Bentham says: "I see no remedy
but that the natural tendency of such doctrine is to impel a man by
force of conscience to rise up in arms against any law whatever he
happens not to like."15 With scorn, he says he will leave it to
Blackstone to demonstrate how any sort of government could survive
with such a doctrine available to citizens. As for natural rights,
16
Bentham brushes them aside impatiently as "nonsense upon stilts."
My impression is that Hogg is clearly in the mainstream of
contemporary legal thinking; the law schools of this country are
overwhelmingly positivistic. Bentham's positivism reigns in our law
15 Fragment, supra, note 7 at 149.
16

j. Bentham, The Works of Jereny Bendam, 1st ed. by J. Bowring (New York: Russell

& Russell, 1962) at 11 and 501.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 No. 2

schools with the force of iron clad ideology. It is almost never
seriously challenged openly; it forms the implicit and explicit
foundations for most discussions of rights. Unless positivism is
understood properly as a dangerous form of relativism, it will have
the effect of working great evil. The Charter has, for the first time,
formally forced this issue to the fore in Canadian legal studies. And
lawyers and law professors, unschooled in the tradition of political
philosophy, suddenly find themselves out of their depth. Their
response to the new pressures tends to be panic or a simplistic and
superficial impatience. We all deserve better.
II. NATURAL LAW REVISITED
At the heart of the issue of natural rights is the question or
problem of natural law. It is necessary, therefore, to revisit this
The first thing to clear
long-repudiated (in legal circles) subject.
up is the confusion that arises out of the use of the expression
"1natural law tradition." There is no single natural law tradition.
The doctrine emerged out of the classical (Plato and Aristotle)
teaching of natural right (natural justice). It is imperative to note,
however, that Plato and Aristotle did not have a natural "law"
teaching. There is no teaching anywhere in Plato or Aristotle that
obliges people to obey the dictates of natural justice under the
threat of penalty (which is what all law does). For the ancient
political philosophers, the primary question was: Is there some right
that is natural, that flows from nature, or is all right (i.e., the
foundation of all law) one of convention, that is, of custom or
human origin?
The easy solution (Hogg's following Bentham) is to assert, in
the face of a wide variety of competing and conflicting claims, that
there is no one conception of justice rooted in nature because we
see all around us a variety of such conceptions. Plato and Aristotle
did not throw in the towel in the face of such obvious facts.
Rather, they set about to examine the issue in all its particulars. We

17 For a good recent overview of Thomistic natural law, see E.A. Goerner, "On Thomistic
Natural Right" (1979) 7 Pol. Theory 101.
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have the result of that process in Plato's Republic18 and Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics;19 books which are no longer read in the law
schools having been driven out by Bentham's disciples. But this
advent does not make the cogency of Plato and Aristotle's
arguments any less compelling. It merely makes those arguments
inaccessible to our law students.
This institutional "value judgment" has acquired, over the
years, the support of rigid orthodoxy. Our law students deserve
better. These books are difficult books which cannot be approached
by impatient hostility. They require a certain kind of openness
which is not always available due to the hostile attitude so deeply
inculcated by Bentham. If one cannot read both of these books,
one should read Aristotle's Ethics2° and ponder carefully what he
says. It is an invitation to converse with a very wise man who spent
many years contemplating the issues, unlike his detractors who spend
almost no time contemplating the issues and less time reading him.
My point is: No law professor or teacher has any right to teach
against the concept of natural right (and natural law) without first
demonstrating that he or she is qualified to teach. The prerequisite
to teach in this matter is a sound knowledge of Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics.
Natural law, as we have come to understand it, emerged out
of the writings of the Stoics who took their bearings from Aristotle.
Even in those writings, natural law first referred to the laws of
physical nature; those "laws" by which nature ruled the physical
world. The Stoics taught that humans participated in an analogous
order; that human beings could discover the law governing human
conduct and in so doing attain the fullness of human perfection by
nature. 21 Under the Stoics, natural law became synonymous with
right reason: the grounds for subduing the passions. One of the
principles of the Stoic natural law teachings was the natural
18 Plato, The Republic, trans. B. Jowett (New York: The Modem Library, 1941).
19 Aristotle, Nicoinachean Ethics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa:
Peripatetic Press, 1984).
20 Aristotle, Ethics (London: Faber, 1973).
21 See Cicero, De natura eIcontun; Acadeinica, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1933) c. I at 40.
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inclination for people to love their fellow humans, not merely fellow
citizens. The prevailing and almost universal abhorrence for
apartheid would appear to be a contemporary manifestation of that
Stoic principle. Implicit in the Stoic natural law teaching is2 2the
concept of divine sanction. No law is a law without sanctions.
It is easy to see how this understanding of natural law could
be gathered under the umbrella of Christian orthodoxy. This is
exactly what Aquinas did.23 For Aquinas, it was a simple matter to
bring the vague Stoic providence within the dictates of revealed
theology. 24 The God of Christianity became the dispenser of
sanctions (in the next world principally), and the Ten
Commandments became understood as divine positive law or explicit
accounts of what natural law contained. This highly charged,
Christianized version of natural law drew its inspiration from the
There are
Stoics and hence the ancient Socratic sources.
fundamental differences, however. Both Plato and Aristotle would
have great difficulty with the Christian overlay provided by Aquinas.
However, the fundamental grounding in nature would nonetheless be
appealing to them. But Thomas is clearly not Aristotle.
III. MODERN NATURAL LAW
The Thomistic or Scholastic natural law teaching dominated
Western civilization until the sixteenth century, that is, until Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704) arrived on the
scene. Hobbes and Locke rejected completely the ScholasticAristotelian foundations of natural law (except the language). They
erected, in its stead, a new natural law that was founded on a new
natural right. Hence, in place of Aristotle's conception of natural
right (or natural justice), Hobbes founded a new natural law on the
foundations of the new natural right of self-preservation.
22 See Cicero, De re publica; De legibus, trans. C.W. Keyes (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959) c. II at 15-17 and c. III at 33-34.
23 See Saint Thomas Aquinas, Sunma theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947) c. la-llae at 90-104.
24 For a critical account of this matter from the Aristotelian perspective, see H.V. Jaffa,
Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
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This new modern natural law shared nothing but the name
with the old natural law. The new natural right of self-preservation
(meaning comfortable self-preservation, not mere existence) was the
basis for the new modern order of "possessive individualism" or
modern capitalism. It rejected the theological aspects so essential to
medieval or Scholastic natural law; it returned to the purely rational
domain and posited the existence of a new natural law on the
foundations of a new natural philosophy. The Biblical foundations
of the old natural law were replaced by a rational account of man's
first condition by nature - the state of nature.
Access to this account of man's truly first condition was not
by way of the Scriptures, but by the human mind reasoning back
upon human experience. Many of our contemporaries today,
unschooled in the history of political philosophy, confuse the new
natural law with the old and tend to talk of a single natural law
tradition. They do not appear to understand that the old and the
new natural law teachings have as much in common as a horse
chestnut and a chestnut horse. The modern philosophers, Hobbes
and Locke, transformed natural law from private law norms into
public law norms. Hobbes's doctrine of sovereignty was meant to
establish, on a firmer footing, the supreme state power or
authority. 25 Locke's teaching culminated in the defiant doctrine of
"no taxation without representation." 26 Under the impulse of the
new natural law, the rallying cry became "the rights of man." The
old Scholastic natural law teaching attempted to teach people their
duties. The new modern natural law liberated people both from the
church as well as from a nature understood as restraining (i.e., it
"liberated" them from duties). The new natural law, founded in the
right to self-preservation, liberated the new modern person and
encouraged him or her to be creative, to conquer nature in the
interest of, as Bacon put it, "relieving man's estate" on this earth.

25 See T. Hobbes, Leviathn, ed. by M. Oakshott (Oxford:

Bezal Blackwell, 1962).

26 See . Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: Hafner, 1947) and see also
J.Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature, 1st ed. by W. von Leyden (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1958).
27 F. Bacon, The New Organon (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960).
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The new natural law eventually solved the old antimony
between nature and convention by demonstrating that, by nature,
man is conventional. Therefore, by nature, human beings are not
restricted by any God-given moral code. Rather, they are the
makers or creators of their own standards or norms. This line of
thinking culminated in Nietzsche for whom there are no standards
by nature: if nothing is prohibited, everything is permitted. 28 Man,
aided by Bentham, becomes, not only the measure of all things, but
the new God, the new creator of his own standards. Justice, in
short, becomes whatever men say it is. In so doing, we come full
cycle and undo or undermine the ancient classical conception of
natural right or natural justice. In the29 words of Faust, "Whirl has
become king, having driven out Zeus."
All this leads to nihilism, and the triumph of modern nihilism
rests secure only if the premises or foundations of the modern
thought remain unchallenged. They have remained unchallenged
thanks to the forceful sophistry of Jeremy Bentham and his
followers. What is required is a reopening of the great debate that
took place in the seventeenth century between the ancients and the
moderns. For, unless we rescue contemporary legal thought from
the clutches of modern positivism, we are doomed to remain
unthinking followers of another man's thinking. In the first place,
we must become aware of how the modern mind has become closed
to real alternatives and, in the second place, we must set about to
do something about it.
IV. CONCLUSION
It should be clear by this point how the question posed in
the title is to be answered. It makes a great deal of difference
whether one is a positivist or not. It makes more than a difference
for Canadians since the adoption of the Charterfor, unless we can
justify those rights in more than the caprice of the passing moment,

28For a good brief account of Nietzsche on this point, see L.P. Thiele, "he Agony of
Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's 'Tlhought" (1990) 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 907.
29 J.W. von Goethe, Faust, trans. by J.Anster (London: Routledge, 1883).
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we are like the blind leading the blind. Above all, it is imperative
for succeeding generations of lawyers to know where we are coming
from and where we are going since they will become the judges
whose duty it will be to clarify the future course of direction. At
the present time, I can sympathize with Peter Hogg when he says:
30
"I do not trust any judge to reach conclusions on these matters."

Our judges are the products of our positivistic law schools. How can
we expect more from them than we have a right to expect? The
current generation of students in our law schools should, however,
demand more because much more will be demanded of them. The
Charterhas, in short, issued a call to revolution no less urgent than
the cry to end, as of right, apartheid in South Africa or the cry for
democracy, as of right, in Eastern Europe.
I am fully aware that this response requires more elaborate
support. But my objective here is a precisely limited one: to open
up a debate that is crucial to our lives, not only as Canadians, but
as human beings. And so, it makes a great deal of difference when
Canada's leading constitutional scholar publicly announces his
positivism. We ought to take it seriously, but, above all, we ought
to demand a justification in reason because the implications and
consequences are profoundly important.

30 Hogg, supra, note 1 at 89.

